

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,**

**v.**

**Criminal Action No. 2:13-cr-46**

**DENNIS LYNN SMITH,  
Defendant.**

**ORDER/OPINION REGARDING PLEA OF GUILTY**

This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge by the District Court for purposes of conducting proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Defendant, Dennis Lynn Smith, in person and by counsel, Brian J. Kornbrath, appeared before me on March 11, 2014. The Government appeared by Assistant United States Attorney Andrew Cogar. The Court determined that Defendant was prepared to enter a plea of “Guilty” to Count Six of the Indictment.

The Court proceeded with the Rule 11 proceeding by first placing Defendant under oath.

The Court determined that Defendant’s plea was pursuant to a written plea agreement, and asked the Government to tender the original to the Court. The Court asked counsel for the Government if the agreement was the sole agreement offered to Defendant. The Government responded that it was and counsel for Defendant confirmed the same. The Court asked counsel for the Government to summarize the written Plea Agreement. Defendant stated that the agreement as summarized by counsel for the Government was correct and complied with his understanding of the agreement. The Court **ORDERED** the written Plea Agreement filed.

The Court then inquired of Defendant whether he was a citizen of the United States. Defendant responded that he is a citizen. The undersigned asked Defendant whether he understood that if he were not a citizen of the United States, by pleading guilty to a felony charge he would be subject to deportation at the conclusion of any sentence; that he would be denied future entry into

the United States; and that he would be denied citizenship if he ever applied for it. Defendant stated that he understood.

The Court next inquired of Defendant concerning his understanding of his right to have an Article III Judge hear the entry of his guilty plea and his understanding of the difference between an Article III Judge and a Magistrate Judge. Defendant thereafter stated in open court that he voluntarily waived his right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept his plea and voluntarily consented to the undersigned Magistrate Judge hearing and accepting his plea, and tendered to the Court a written Waiver of Article III Judge and Consent To Enter Guilty Plea Before Magistrate Judge, which waiver and consent was signed by Defendant and countersigned by Defendant's counsel and was concurred in by the signature of the Assistant United States Attorney appearing.

Upon consideration of the sworn testimony of Defendant, as well as the representations of his counsel and the representations of the Government, the Court finds that the oral and written waiver of Article III Judge and consent to enter guilty plea before a Magistrate Judge was freely and voluntarily given and the written waiver and consent was freely and voluntarily executed by Defendant, Dennis Lynn Smith, only after having had his rights fully explained to him and having a full understanding of those rights through consultation with his counsel, as well as through questioning by the Court. The Court **ORDERED** the written Waiver and Consent to Enter Guilty Plea before a Magistrate Judge filed and made part of the record.

The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant Count Six of the Indictment and the elements the Government would have to prove, charging him with maintaining a drug-involved premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant the statutory penalties applicable to an individual adjudicated guilty of the felony charges contained in Count Six

of the Indictment, the impact of the sentencing guidelines on sentencing in general, and inquired of Defendant as to his competency to proceed with the plea hearing. From said review the undersigned Magistrate Judge determined Defendant understood the nature of the charges pending against him and understood the possible statutory maximum sentence which could be imposed upon his conviction or adjudication of guilty on Count Six was imprisonment for a term of not more than twenty (20) years; understood that a fine of not more than \$500,000.00 could be imposed; understood that both fine and imprisonment could be imposed; understood he would be subject to a period of at least three (3) years of supervised release; and understood the Court would impose a special mandatory assessment of \$100.00 for the felony conviction payable on or before the date of sentencing. Defendant also understood that his sentence could be increased if he had a prior firearm offense, violent felony conviction, or prior drug conviction. He also understood he might be required by the Court to pay the costs of his incarceration and supervised release.

The undersigned also reviewed with Defendant his waiver of appellate rights as follows:

Ct: Did you and Mr. Kornbrath discuss that you have a right under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal your conviction and your sentence to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals by providing written notice of intent to appeal within 14 days of sentencing?

Def. Yes, Your Honor.

Ct. Did you and Mr. Kornbrath also discuss that you may collaterally attack or challenge the sentence and how that sentence is being carried out by filing a writ of habeas corpus type motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255?

Def. Yes, Your Honor.

Ct. Did you understand from paragraph 13 of your written plea agreement that if your actual sentence is the equivalent of an advisory Guidelines sentence which has a total offense level of 23 or lower, then you give up—waive—your right to directly appeal that actual sentence to the Fourth Circuit and you give up your right to collaterally attack or challenge that sentence by filing a writ of habeas corpus type motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255?

Def. Yes, Your Honor.

Ct. You fully understood that on February the 10<sup>th</sup> when you signed the written agreement?

Def. Yes, Your Honor.

Ct. And nothing about your understanding has changed between then and today?

Def. That's correct.

Ct. And your understanding of that provision is precisely, or exactly, as I just explained it to you?

Def. Yes, Your Honor.

From the foregoing colloquy the undersigned determined that Defendant understood his appellate rights and knowingly gave up those rights pursuant to the condition contained in the written plea agreement.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge further examined Defendant relative to his knowledgeable and voluntary execution of the written plea bargain agreement, and determined the entry into said written plea bargain agreement was both knowledgeable and voluntary on the part of Defendant. The undersigned then inquired of Defendant regarding his understanding of the written plea agreement. Defendant stated he understood the terms of the written plea agreement and also stated that it

contained the whole of his agreement with the Government and no promises or representations were made to him by the Government other than those terms contained in the written plea agreement.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge further inquired of Defendant, his counsel, and the Government as to the non-binding recommendations and stipulation contained in the written plea bargain agreement and determined that Defendant understood, with respect to the plea bargain agreement and to Defendant's entry of a plea of guilty to the felony charge contained in Count Six of the Indictment, the undersigned Magistrate Judge would write the subject Order and would further order a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the probation officer attending the District Court. The undersigned advised the Defendant that the District Judge would adjudicate the Defendant guilty of the felonies charged under Count Six of the Indictment. Only after the District Court had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence investigation report, would the District Court make a determination as to whether to accept or reject any recommendation or stipulation contained within the plea agreement or pre-sentence report. The undersigned reiterated to the Defendant that the District Judge may not agree with the recommendations or stipulation contained in the written agreement. The undersigned Magistrate Judge further advised Defendant, in accord with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, that in the event the District Court Judge refused to follow the non-binding recommendations or stipulation contained in the written plea agreement and/or sentenced him to a sentence which was different from that which he expected, he would not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant and his counsel each acknowledged their understanding and Defendant maintained his desire to have his plea of guilty accepted.

Defendant also understood that his actual sentence could not be calculated until after a pre-sentence report was prepared and a sentencing hearing conducted. The undersigned also advised,

and Defendant stated that he understood, that the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and that, even if the District Judge did not follow the Sentencing Guidelines or sentenced him to a higher sentence than he expected, he would not have a right to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant further stated his attorney showed him how the advisory guideline chart worked but did not promise him any specific sentence at the time of sentencing. Defendant stated that he understood his attorney could not predict or promise him what actual sentence he would receive from the sentencing judge at the sentencing hearing. Defendant further understood there was no parole in the federal system, although he may be able to earn institutional good time, and that good time was not controlled by the Court, but by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Thereupon, Defendant, Dennis Lynn Smith, with the consent of his counsel, Brian J. Kornbrath, proceeded to enter a verbal plea of **GUILTY** to the felony charge in Count Six of the Indictment.

The Court would generally hear the testimony of a witness to establish an independent basis in fact for Defendant's plea. However, the parties agreed that the stipulation contained in paragraph nine of the written plea agreement provides the independent basis in fact. That stipulation provides:

Pursuant to Sections 6B1.4 and 1B1.3 of the Guidelines, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that, in March 2013, the defendant managed and controlled his residence near Schmucker Road, in Upper Tract, Pendleton County, within the Northern District of West Virginia, as a lessee and occupant, and knowingly and intentionally rented, leased and made available the residence to unlawfully store and use a controlled substance, to wit, methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug controlled substance. The parties further stipulate and agree that the defendant's relevant conduct is at least 10 grams but less than 40 grams of pseudoephedrine.

Defendant stated he heard, understood, and did not disagree with the factual stipulation. The undersigned United States Magistrate Judge concludes the offenses charged in Count Six of the Indictment are supported by an independent basis in fact concerning each of the essential elements of such offenses. That independent basis is provided by the factual stipulation set forth above. Upon

consideration of all of the above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea; Defendant is aware of and understood his right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept his plea and elected to voluntarily consent to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge hearing and accepting his plea; Defendant understood the charges against him, not only as to the Indictment as a whole, but in particular as to Count Six of the Indictment; Defendant understood the consequences of his plea of guilty, in particular the maximum statutory penalty to which he would be exposed for Count Six; Defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to Count Six of the Indictment; and Defendant's plea is independently supported by the factual stipulation which provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of each of the essential elements of the charges to which Defendant has pled guilty.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge therefore **ACCEPTS** Defendant's plea of guilty to Count Six of the Indictment and recommends he be adjudged guilty on said charges as contained in Count Six of the Indictment and have sentence imposed accordingly.

The undersigned further directs that a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the adult probation officer assigned to this case.

Defendant is released pursuant to the Order Setting Conditions of Release previously entered in this matter.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Order/Opinion to counsel of record.

DATED: March 12, 2014

*John S. Kaull*

JOHN S. KAULL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE